Disclaimers. The images shown are for illustration purposes only
LEST WE FORGET
Special Operation,
May 1973, Serian, Kuching, Sarawak
One morning in May, 1973, the CO, Col Looi Kam Cheong, called me into his room at Serian Battalion Headquarters to tell me that a SEP (Surrendered Enemy Personnel) was being held at the Serian Police Station.
My order was to get details from this SEP and to get him to lead me to his past camps, to track down any CTs(Communists Terrorists) that may be still lurking in that vicinity.
I went to the Police station to interrogate the SEP. He was a thin, sickly, skinny young lad of about 20 years old. I told him of my order for him to lead me into the areas where he had operated before, which he readily agreed. I told him that we will supply him with our jungle green uniforms, jungle boots and a pack with the necessary spare clothing and rations for one week.
I specifically told him in Malay, “Kalau awak lari, Awak akan ditembak”. (If you try to run, you will be shot.)
The Operations
The next day, early morning, with one platoonAC from my ‘C’ company, we left Serian to our debussing point which was about 5 kilometres to the south of the Serian Town. With two leading scouts, then the SEP and myself we started to track into the jungles. The terrain was undulating and mostly covered by secondary jungle. The track was frequently used by the locals, was well defined and easy to follow.
It made me wonder how these CTs had been confidently operating so close to Serian Town and that close to our Battalion Headquarters. I believe that these CTs must have thought that the authorities will not look into the areas so near a military Battalion Headquarters and so close the town. As this SEP was an ex-student from the Serian Chinese School he must have many sympathisers to support his presence and their group operating there in terms of logistics and information of security forces movements in the area. Without these support the CTs will not be able to survive in the jungle.
The first day’s tracking was uneventful. We found two of their old camps near the Serian River which had been abandoned for some time. We based up that evening near the river with NTR (nothing interesting to report)
The SEP rested near to my base. I noticed how simple he eats his food and how simple he slept. There was an old raised wooden platform which he used as his bed. He just lay down and slept soundly without a care to the world despite the enormous numbers of mosquitoes biting him on his arms, neck and face. I remember seeing a ‘black’ patch of mosquitoes that had settled on his forearm for a feed.
Day Two.
We left camp early and proceeded to track to the next CT camp. At about 1000 hours we approached an old CT camp from the side when we heard voices talking fairly loud from the opposite direction, its main entrance.
Our good training in our jungle tactics and movements had given us the advantage of discipline and stealth. I stopped our group from entering the camp and kept watch as 4 CTs dressed in jungle green, carrying packs and weapons entered and immediately proceeded to the centre of the camp. They kept on talking. As I watched, two CTs went to the exit area to be posted as sentries. The other two proceeded to cook. I withdrew my troops for an ‘O’ (order) group.
Planning the Assault
It is not unusual for the main CT group to follow the advance group into the camp. With this in my mind, I set the ‘H” hour at 1130 hours which is about one and a half hours away. This is to give time for:
a. The main CT group to join this advance party that we just saw, and,
b. To give time for our own cut-off section to move into position.
I was hoping to ambush the main group had it joined this advance party.
One section under Sgt Shamsuddin was ordered to move into a cut-off position which was to be well ahead of the sentries whom we saw posted earlier at the EX-CT camp’s exit point. He was reminded to be in position well before our ‘H’ hour.
We left all our gears at the ‘O’ group area together with the SEP and two guards. We carried our riffles and ammos while we waited for ‘H” hour. We moved into position about 1110 hours. We were ready for the assault about ll.20hours but alas, five minutes later, at ll25 hours, we saw the two CTs, at the centre of the camp, in a hurry, lifted their packs and slung their riffles and headed straight for the exit.
Given no choice my left flank troopers opened fire leaving me with much regret as I saw that the two CTs had existed from this camp. We assaulted forward into the camp.
Then within a few minutes I heard our cut-off group opened fire. Listening into my radio, I heard Sgt Shamsuddin’s voice, “Tuan, kita dapat dua,” (Sir, we got two) much to my delight.
Two CT’s managed to escape. It was a success, no doubt although two others escaped. I reported our contact and requested for immediate bodyvac. (Body evacuation) The dead CTs were carried into the centre of the camp.
I sent out patrols while preparing for the helicopter’s arrival.
The helicopter arrived about 1430 hours and it circled overhead before dropping two body-bags. We packed the two dead CTs into the body-bags and tied the winch to its handles to be winched up. Hovering about 200 meters above, the bodies were being slowly winched upwards. However at about the half-way point, 100 meters, I saw first a pair of legs protruding from the body-bag; then the second pair of legs from the other bag. ‘Shit, I thought,’ and sure enough the bodies of both CTs dropped from the ‘sky’ soon enough. The helicopter flew off and returned with another two more body-bags.
I looked at the dead fallen CTs, then at my troops. My troops were also looking at me, wondering what I was going to do! Showing a good example, I approached and handled the dead CTs. See this my troops came forward to assist in repacked the CTs again into the body-bags. This time we secured the bodies to the body bags by tying the bodies to their respective bags. The helicopter returned to successfully winched the bodies up into the cabin where it was sent to Kuching Hospital for further actions by the Police Special Branch personnel.
Conclusion.
The success of this operation is due to the following:
-
Close cooperation between the Police Special Branch and the Army.
-
The CTs operating in that area were too complacent.
-
Our good training. We were able to move silently and quietly as per our training.
-
Good command and control. Good simple and easy to follow instructions.
-
The ‘H’ hour I selected was not good. The time gap was also too long (one and half hour) taking into consideration the CTs that we saw were stopping to cook a quick lunch.
-
The selection of ‘H’ hour at 1130hours was not good. We should refrain from the half hour, or full hour mark. Better to select 1125hours or 1059hours.
Recognition.
I praise Sgt Shamsuddin and his section for setting up an excellent cut-off, ambush position.
This ambush was sprung with 100 percent success.
Some form of recognition or reward should be awarded for his good work.
(En Shamsuddin passed away on 22 July 2024)
Yet, I believe, if I have not written this script, nobody will ever know…………….
Script by: Captain Tan Too Giok (R)
Commander of the above Operation.
